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INTRODUCTION 
The press has long communicated news from Washington to the rest of the nation. It has acted 
both as a source of information and as force of political socialization in its delivery of information from 
the federal government to its constituents. While officials from the legislative and executive branches 
highly value and rely on interactions with the press, the Supreme Court largely asserts its independence 
from the media. This resistance is evidenced by the Court’s former and current prohibitions against 
common journalistic practices involving the use of cameras, live-streamed audio, or live-tweeting. The 
Court also declines to explain or make explicit the implications of their rulings, all the while relying on 
the press to propagate the outcomes of its decisions.  
This relative lack of initiative from the Supreme Court tilts power to Court reporters. 
Compared with those who represent legislative or executive policy, reporters are imbued with 
substantial discretion in choosing how to frame and interpret complicated Court decisions. Since the 
Supreme Court and the press are not as closely tied as are the press and the other two branches, nor 
their relationship as carefully documented, a preliminary question arises: how do the Supreme Court 
and the news media influence each other in terms of arguments and frames, and how has that changed 
through time?   
This paper takes on that question within one specific subject matter. Specifically, this paper 
examines how the Court and media interface with and react to each other’s arguments, justification, and 
framing of the death penalty. As the philosophical justification behind the use of capital punishment 
evolves, how can we describe the similarities and differences between how the Supreme Court frames 
issues of capital punishment and how the press portrays the same? If there are similarities or 
divergences, what accounts for these? 
To answer these questions, this case-study analysis identifies three sets of chronologically-
related and issue-related death penalty cases and compares the presence and importance of the varying 
Supreme Court arguments and newspaper frames. The first set of cases (1970s) concerns the 
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arbitrariness of certain procedures like jury instructions and trial format; the second (1980s-2000s), 
execution of the mentally retarded; and the third (1980s-2000s), execution of juveniles. These three 
issue areas are especially interesting to study since with each issue, the Court has reversed its past 
decision(s). The possible outcomes of the analyses are described by four hypotheses. It is important to 
note that multiple hypotheses may be true, depending on which issue areas are examined, and the frame 
in question.   
 
Hypotheses 
1.) The Supreme Court leads and defines the arguments on death penalty issues. Media coverage of 
death penalty cases tends to reflect arguments originating from the Court, and sometimes lags 
behind in the adoption of Supreme Court arguments.  
2.) The press leads and defines the arguments on death penalty issues. Courts internalize media 
opinions or are otherwise guided by citizen sentiment, and not just by legal precedent and findings 
alone. The Supreme Court adopts certain arguments from the media.  
3.) There is a perfect alignment between arguments and frames employed by the Supreme Court and 
the news media. 
4.) There is no alignment whatsoever between arguments and frames employed by the Supreme Court 
and the news media. 
 
Background History and Previous Scholarship 
Three reasons compel this focus on Supreme Court capital punishment cases. First, the death 
penalty is a divisive, controversial issue that invariably gains much media attention. This assures that for 
any given death penalty case examined, there exist newspaper articles providing coverage of the 
decision. Second, only 39 Supreme Court cases exist concerning capital punishment, and for each of 
them, the Supreme Court opinions and corresponding newspaper articles can be located. Third and 
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most importantly, no studies have ever been done looking at the intersection of the Court and media 
through the lens of capital punishment. 
While there exists considerable literature on the relationship between the Supreme Court and 
public opinion, as well as between the press and public opinion, relatively little has been researched on 
the interaction between the Supreme Court and the press. There is a certain intrigue to studying why 
this is the case, especially since the media almost has free reign in framing Court decisions. This 
freedom to interpret comes from what media scholars have diagnosed as a bottleneck effect in what the 
Court can communicate to the public. Since Court decisions are often very lengthy and complex, the 
public prefers to rely on simplified interpretations from journalists.  
In addition to this curious feature of the relationship between the Supreme Court and media, 
what research has been done on the dynamic has been both (1) unilateral, in the direction of the 
Supreme Court’s influence on the press, and (2) virtually nonexistent when it comes to focused analysis 
of capital punishment cases. This vacuum suggests that the conclusions of the present research not only 
will prove interesting in and of themselves but will also add to an area lacking in scholarship. Through 
its focus on the bilateral nature of interaction and influence between the Supreme Court and news 
media, this paper amends some holes in social science research left by earlier surveys on the subject.  
In reading about how the media covers the Supreme Court, one is constantly reminded of a 
famous parallel relationship in mythology: that of the Minotaur in the labyrinth and the Athenian 
citizens he terrorized. In the case of the Court and newsprint media, the Court is the Minotaur, a demi-
god resistant to change, and the media, a relatively agentless and naive group of youths charged to 
navigate the confusion of its labyrinthine ways. Neither party seems to be entirely satisfied with the 
other; the Supreme Court has historically bemoaned the lack of quality journalists covering its beat, and 
the journalists themselves find constraints in discerning what responsibilities they themselves bear as 
the interpreters of the Court. The comparisons end there, for the Supreme Court is unlikely to meet 
upon its Theseus any time soon. 
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Additionally, there seems to exist a greater potential for reporter framing in the coverage of 
Court cases than in coverage of politics. Compare the reclusive nature of the Justices to the extents that 
some politicians go to in order to control their publicity trails. For the most part, Supreme Court 
Justices attempt to minimize their interactions with court reporters and avoid publicity, hoping to train 
more attention to the case dockets at hand. This distancing behavior may attribute to what some view 
as the press’ advantage in being able to frame public discussion on the Court’s cases. As Michael E. 
Slotnik notes, “the press becomes almost as important as the events themselves in the formulation of 
perceived reality” (1991, 128). Slotnik also points out a parallel in the actual academic work done on 
media and the Supreme Court: “To the extent that such studies [on media coverage of governmental 
institutions] exist, the major focus has been on Congress and the presidency, with special attention 
placed on the presidential nomination and election process” (141).  
Of the observations made about the Supreme Court and the public at large, most have centered 
on how the Court impacts its citizens and evokes policy responses from politicians, and not on the 
direct link from the Court to the press. Jeffery Mondak’s findings shed a rare light on the source of the 
Court’s power. Mondak’s research (1984) indicates that the Supreme Court’s power derives from its 
institutional legitimacy and that while media portrayals of the Court may impact that perception, the 
deep-seated reverence of the Court enables lends the institution its credibility.   
Perhaps one of the reasons that little research exists on the dyad of the Supreme Court and 
newsprint is that it is hard to measure precisely what kind of linguistic and attitudinal differences lie in 
the Justices’ opinions and newspaper portrayal of the same. Consequently, much of the research 
gathered on the salience of Supreme Court verdicts has neglected the role that newspapers play in favor 
of focusing on public opinion alone. For example, Hoekstra (2000) focuses on the interplay of the 
Supreme Court and a local public, using newspaper articles as a measure of availability of information. 
Hoekstra’s focus is not so much the media’s role in reframing and interpreting the Supreme Court 
decisions as it is using the media as a metric of public opinion. In order to establish a methodology 
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appropriate for measuring those elusive linguistic and attitudinal differences, this study turned to related 
research done on the Supreme Court. 
 Two main methods of inquiry stand out.  On one hand, Mondak’s coding methodology sheds 
light on relevant criteria of assessment (1984). Mondak coded certain articles based on the information 
presented: Did the information reveal the strength of decision i.e. 9-0 or 5-4? Did the article mention 
precedent or evoke the constitution? Did the article allude to community response and peer criticism? 
Spill and Oxley (2003), on the other hand, focus on whether the increased politicization of 
Supreme Court coverage in media is better explained by differences in medium (TV or newsprint) or 
the kind of reporter (courtroom regulars or not). They do so by researching all news coverage they 
could find in Lexis-Nexis on two cases within a set time period and coding each sentence if it contained 
“politicized language” or demonstrated a “legalistic” mindset—variables that are softer and qualitative 
in nature. This utilization of Lexis-Nexis for its news content has similarly been employed by Noam 
Chomsky and Edward Herman in their discussion of the propaganda model, especially in their use if 
word searches throughout various news sources to isolate what kind of politically-charged language is 
used in which context (2002, xxiii). This paper owes much to the methodology employed by Spill and 
Oxley, as it similarly attempts to identify the presence of and measure the importance of qualitative 
variables within news articles. 
 
Why Capital Punishment? 
Mondak’s general observations about the salience of issues (that there exists an inverse 
relationship between prominence and perceived policy legitimacy of court decisions in the case that the 
personal view is contrary to the ruling) make capital punishment especially intriguing. Punishment is a 
concept that is widely understood by most newspaper audiences, and the death penalty is especially 
salient (Yanus 2009). Practically speaking, there are only 39 Supreme Court cases related to capital 
punishment, making it easy to choose case studies. Additionally, there has been no previous research I 
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could find that investigated the question of Court and Media relations with the specific lens of capital 
punishment.  
My research examines the changes in death penalty jurisprudence and its implementation from 
the 1970s to the present. The death penalty has been a mode of punishment since the foundation of the 
American legal system, and its implementation was largely left to the states until the 1970s. From 1967 
to 1976, the death penalty was subject to a brief moratorium, on the brink of being abolished, and then 
reapproved. It was affirmed as a valid form of punishment for the mentally retarded and juveniles in 
1989, but then abolished for those two groups of people in 2002 and 2005 respectively. These dramatic 
changes indicate that the national consensus surrounding issues of the death penalty changed, and 
changed quickly. (To put this into perspective, of the 39 death penalty cases decided by the Supreme 
Court, only 5 cases came before the 1971 McGautha case, the rest ensuing in the following forty year 
period.) 
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METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
I used a case-study approach to evaluate the framing and language used by Justices and media in 
cases that involve capital punishment. Since I am interested in change over time in the use of framing 
and rhetoric, and because there are a total of 39 capital punishment cases over the span of about a 
century and a half, a case-study approach is most appropriate for modeling change. Change modeled 
demonstrates the alignment and misalignment between the Justices’ perceptions, justifications, and 
framing of capital punishment and the media’s appraisal of the same. 
To this end, I performed a content-analysis of newspaper articles as well as of the majority and 
dissenting opinions of the same to study change in language and framing over time. I relied on 
academic and philosophical publications to guide me on what specific discursive patterns match with 
what philosophical justifications of punishment. 
In order to demonstrate shifts in opinion and justifications, both on the side of the Court and 
also in that of the news media, I selected sets of cases that complement each other in subject matter but 
differ greatly in their rulings. Set 1 is comprised of the chronologically-proximate cases of McGautha v. 
California (1971), Furman v. Georgia (1972), and Gregg v. Georgia (1976). Each case is related in theme to 
the one preceding it. What is remarkable about this set of cases is that, in the span of six years, the 
Court seems to have greatly vacillated in applying the cruel and unusual standard to the death penalty—
this is very evident in the drastically different findings of the three cases. McGautha found in 1971 that 
the death penalty could be prescribed by juries without the existence of national standards (the case is 
commonly read as basically affirming the death penalty); yet Furman, decided only one year later, 
effectively rendered the death penalty statutes of the vast majority of states unconstitutional on the 
basis of its arbitrary application. Gregg represented the response from several state legislatures that 
hoped to reinstate their death penalty statutes in the wake of the Furman ruling.   
Set 2 is composed of Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) and Atkins v. Virginia (2002), two cases that 
investigated the constitutionality of executing convicted criminals who were deemed mentally retarded. 
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In Penry, the Court permitted the practice, but it reversed its own decision in Atkins only thirteen years 
later when it found that a substantial amount of objective indicia had demonstrated in both popular and 
legislative opinion that the public considered the practice cruel and unusual.  
Set 3 is composed of Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) and Roper v. Simmons (2005). Set 3 also illustrates 
a dramatic reversal in the Court’s ruling on the application of the death penalty, specifically as applied 
to minors. In Stanford, the Court found the practice permissible, but reversed that decision in Roper just 
sixteen years later.  
 
Data Collection and Methods 
Determining the Argument or Frame 
For each case, I coded and analyzed the narrative of the general theme of the Supreme Court 
opinion. Additionally, I applied the same analysis to the relevant newspaper articles, quantifying the 
proportion of all news stories for one case in terms of whether they fell into one category of 
justification/framing or multiple categories. Each newspaper article could be recorded to have up to 
three frames, each of which will be ranked by their relative importance. Each Supreme Court case could 
have up to three arguments.  
I have identified eight frames/arguments relevant to the death penalty. They are derived as 
much from literature on the subject of punishment as they are from observations of the Supreme Court 
opinions themselves. Three justifications, or “general justifying aims,” of punishment (retribution, 
rehabilitation, and utilitarian calculations) stand out as the most robust and most moral in nature in 
both the literature and Court opinions (Hart 1968, 5). Yet, as Feinberg demonstrates, Hart’s three 
justifications are by no means mutually exclusive, which is why the coding methodology allows for each 
newspaper article or Supreme Court opinion to be coded for up to three separate frames or arguments.  
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The relevant eight frames and arguments are deterrence, retribution, cost, rehabilitation, caprice/bias, 
procedural deficiencies, international trends, and historical practice. Brief descriptions of each frame, and the 
concepts associated with that frame are provided below. 
Deterrence. This utilitarian argument claims that crime can be disincentivized or prevented if the 
consequences for committing the crime are sufficiently harsh or undesirable. The deterrence argument 
can be split into two kinds, that of specific deterrence and general deterrence. Specific deterrence refers 
to incapacitating a criminal so that he cannot repeat the same crime again, e.g., killing the criminal so 
that he cannot harm more people, or confining him within prison so he does not appear in public. 
General deterrence refers to using punishment to prevent criminal behavior in the general populace, 
e.g., imposing a fine or prison sentence on assault so that people will be less inclined to commit the 
crime for fear of the consequences.   
Retribution. The retributive approach to punishment rests in the belief that if a certain crime is 
committed, than a certain kind of punishment must be meted out. It is the most complex frame 
discussed, since it encapsulates discussions of justice, proportionality, moral reprehensibility, moral 
culpability, and mercy. Under this frame, a crime that is committed must be met with just and 
corresponding punishment. Retributive framing is also sometimes used to express the view that the 
victim’s family members have a right to inflict punishment on the criminal. In a society with both 
penalties (fines) and punishments (hard labor or corporal punishment), we still choose to implement 
punishment because it carries with it an “expressive notion of resentment and indignation” (Feinberg 
1980, 23-6). Capital punishment, the most extreme version of corporal punishment, is the most 
adamant way society can demonstrate the symbolic significance of some crimes that simply cannot be 
tolerated. 
Cost. Like the retributive argument, the cost argument is also a utilitarian argument, but it 
departs from the retributive argument in its simplicity. The argument discusses the financial and social 
costs of implementing penal policy. Some death penalty abolitionists use this frame to supplement 
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other arguments by saying that it is cheaper to sentence a criminal to life imprisonment than to execute 
him, due to the costs associated with appeal suits and execution procedures. The cost frame has been 
invoked by Justices in their defense of maintaining the status quo in death penalty policy, since the 
required costs in amending statutes and revamping the criminal justice system may cost too much 
compared to the marginal benefits gained.  
Rehabilitation. The rehabilitative frame appeals to the idea of mitigating circumstances (and 
therefore may be linked to the retributive frame) and the possibility of reintegrating the offending 
criminal back into society. The frame assumes that there can be external influences acting on an 
individual that either makes the person involuntarily commit a crime, or more easily conditioned out of 
repeating the offending behavior. Proponents of using punishment for rehabilitation argue that, given 
the presence of mitigating factors (age, lack of faculties) should actually be rehabilitative—offenders 
should be targeted for reintegration and recovery, not punitive expressions of societal mores. 
Caprice/bias. Since the 1960’s, opponents of capital punishment have pointed to the race-
conscious and class-based applications of the death penalty as critical evidence of its unfairness. They 
invoke the caprice/bias argument and point to human error and jury biases that create punishment 
schemes that routinely sentence more minorities, whether in race, education level or in socioeconomic 
status. A report cited in Gregg v. Georgia that investigates this argument, “The President’s Commission 
on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice,” keenly describes the claims of the 
caprice/bias frame: “Finally, there is evidence that the imposition of the death sentence and the 
exercise of dispensing power by the courts and the executive follow discriminatory patterns. The death 
sentence is disproportionately imposed, and carried out on the poor, the Negro, and the members of 
unpopular groups” (428 U.S. 153). Equity is a large part of this critique of the death penalty: should we 
engage in the use of capital punishment if it disproportionately penalizes one section of society?  
Procedural deficiencies. This frame approaches capital punishment from a structural perspective: it 
interrogates whether the existing judicial structures interact in such a way that allows for systematic 
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discrimination against a group of people. This frame is similar to the caprice/bias frame but departs 
significantly from it in that the origin of procedural deficiencies lies in the domain of the court system 
and the statutory documents that construct it, whereas the perpetrators of caprice/bias are individual 
actors (district attorneys, juries, litigators, etc.). 
International trends. A relatively new frame is that of comparing capital punishment policies of the 
United States with those of its peers for a normative comparison of death penalty policies. Reliance on 
or reference to foreign laws in determining domestic policy has been a contentious issue for the 
Supreme Court. 
Historical practice. Originalist interpreters of the Constitution sometimes invoke this frame to 
argue that the death penalty was explicitly acknowledged in our Constitution, and further, that the death 
penalty was a common form of punishment in the Framers’ days, thus making the punishment neither 
cruel nor unusual.  
 
Supreme Court Opinions 
After a thorough review of each pertinent Supreme Court decision, including assessments of 
both the majority and the dissenting opinions, arguments of capital punishment were identified and 
then ranked by strength. For example, a case in which several Justices discuss the implications of the 
arbitrary or capricious rendering of sentences in their opinions would be marked as employing the 
caprice/bias argument. A case in which a number of opinions devote significant time to the 
questionable ability of the death sentence to serve as a deterrent mechanism would be categorized as 
using a deterrence argument. While there is a degree of subjectivity in the assignment of arguments, 
replicability in future assignment of arguments of the cases is ensured by the descriptions and examples 
of each argument in the definitions provided.  
 
Article Analyses 
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Relevant news articles were identified using ProQuest’s newspaper archives. For each article, 
two inputs were selected: the case name and the phrase “Supreme Court.” An explanation for the 
search criteria is enumerated below.1 For each case, I searched the same 12 ProQuest historical 
Newspaper Databases,2 each of which more or less spans the time periods of the cases selected for 
study. Only relevant articles were selected for inclusion. Articles were considered relevant when they 
devote at least 50% of the word count to the case at hand (this is to exclude analysis of Supreme Court 
hearing overview articles, which tend to be short and cover all of the cases the Court has granted 
certiorari to, or has decided without specific discussion of the case in question).  
After identifying three frames for each article analyzed, the presence of other factors are 
recorded.  
• Date of publication 
• Headline 
• Publishing organization (e.g., New York Times, Baltimore Sun, etc.) 
• Breakdown of decision 
• Direct quotes from majority Justices  
                                                
1 The vast majority of Capital Punishment cases that reach the Supreme Court arise out of 
2  ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Atlanta Daily World (1931-2003) ; ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers: Baltimore Sun, The (1837-1987); ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Chicago Tribune 
(1849-1989) ; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Atlanta Constitution (1868-1945) ; ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers: Atlanta Daily World (1931-2003) ; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Baltimore 
Sun, The (1837-1987) ; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Chicago Tribune (1849-1989) ; ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers: The Guardian (1821-2003) and The Observer (1791-2003) ; ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers: Los Angeles Sentinel (1934-2005) ; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Wall Street 
Journal (1889-1995); ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009); ProQuest: 
The Wall Street Journal (1984-current). 
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• Direct quotes from dissenting Justices 
• Court-focused? (fixates on predicting or analyzing voting patterns of Justices instead of legal 
question at stake) 
• Case-fact focused? (focuses on distinguishing case facts and case itself from other cases, with 
less focus on Justices) 
• Editorializing?  
• Mitigating background story of defendants? 
• Description of crime committed?  
• Mention of amicus curiae? 
• Invokes phrase “cruel and unusual”? 
• Invokes phrase “evolving standards”?3 
• Discusses implications of decision on current death row population or statutes?  
• Citation of previously-decided cases?  
 
While the additional factors enumerated are self-evident, it may be less clear to the reader how 
frames are allocated and assigned in terms of rankings. Appendix A provides a coded example of a 
newspaper article reporting on the Furman decision that not only identifies the additional factors above, 
but also the relative strengths of the frames in the article.  
 
  
                                                
3 Many articles cite the “evolving standards” of society as a means of justifying the abolition of 
the death penalty. I do not consider this as a frame because it is a blanket statement that derives its real 
explanatory power from one of the other frames I have enumerated. For example, if a journalist cites 
evolving standards as the reason that citizens in X state turn down juvenile executions, the real power 
of the shift actually derives from, for example, the arbitrary nature of the practice, the chance of 
rehabilitation for young people, or of the unknowable truth of innocence. The evolving standards 
frame may embody any one of these more nuanced explanations, but on its own, indicates nothing 
more than a change in how we view punishment. It is therefore not a very useful or explanatory frame, 
and for that reason, has been excluded from my analysis.  
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EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Set 1: Unlimited Discretion of Jury, Procedural Fairness of Death Penalty Sentencing: 
McGautha v. California (1971), Furman v. Georgia (1972), and Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 
McGautha v. California (1971)  
Case background 
McGautha v. California was decided in the Supreme Court in 1971. Prior to this case, only five 
other capital punishment cases had been decided by the Supreme Court. Two issues concerning the 
death penalty were decided in the McGautha case. The Court ruled first that the death penalty could be 
prescribed by a jury, without the jury’s being given standards to govern its imposition, and second, that 
deciding capital punishment cases through single unitary proceedings was constitutional.    
McGautha v. California (402 U. S. 210) combined cases from petitioners McGautha (California) 
and Crampton (Ohio). McGautha was found guilty of murder in a bifurcated trial in California, where 
two juries separately determined his guilt and then the sentence to affix to that guilt. Crampton was 
found guilty of murder in a single unitary trial in Ohio, one where guilt and sentencing was determined 
together and by the same jury.  
Both petitioners argued that their standards governing their trials violated the Due Process 
Clause. McGautha argued that there was no due process of law in allowing the jury to impose the death 
penalty without any governing standards, claiming that the jury instructions for his trial was insufficient 
to fulfill the Due Process Clause. The Californian judicial system, he claimed, deprived him of the Due 
Process protection found in Article 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment (“Nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...”).  
Crampton’s case was considerably different. Whereas McGautha took issue with the jury 
instructions, Crampton argued that Ohio’s single unitary procedures put two of his Constitutionally-
protected rights into irresolvable tension: the right against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth, 
and the Due Protection protection rights from the Fourteenth. In single unitary trials, unlike bifurcated 
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trials (such as the one that McGautha had), guilt and sentencing is determined in one trial. This 
essentially means that after a jury returns a verdict on guilt, the same jury decides the sentence.  
Crampton argued that in order to effectively plead not guilty during the guilt-finding phase 
(where he would have to speak on his own behalf) he would compromise his 5th Amendment right 
against self-incrimination in the sentencing phase. In practice, his argument could be seen as: If I claim 
that I am innocent, but am nonetheless found guilty, then the same jury who is already convinced that I 
am guilty, now also may think me dishonest and a perjurer in my attempt to establish myself as not-
guilty. This would undoubtedly prejudice them in their application of my sentence, especially when the 
standards jury instructions on death penalty cases are so sparse.  
The majority Justices (Harlan, Burger, Stewart, White, Blackmun, Black) found “no 
constitutional infirmity in the conviction of either petition, and affirm[ed]” the lower court rulings in 
for both McGautha and Crampton.  
To rebut McGautha’s claim that standardless-jury discretion in death penalty cases, the Court 
argued that it was not only impossible to enumerate the standards and factors of considerations to 
present to a jury for capital sentencing, but that for governments to do so would actually be deleterious 
for punished. “For a court to attempt to catalog the appropriate factors in this elusive area could 
inhibit, rather than expand, the scope of consideration, for no list of circumstances would ever be 
complete.” 
The Justices spent more time to address Crampton’s claim. They stated: “We do not think that 
Ohio was required to provide an opportunity for petitioner to speak to the jury free from any adverse 
consequences on the issue of guilt.” In other words, unitary trials, which use one jury to assign both 
guilt and sentencing, do not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
The Justices referred to time-honored traditions concerning those accused of capital crimes to 
justify their decision. In this case, the Justices argued, it is not a violation of the Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination to compel a defendant to be cross-examined since they themselves chose to 
 16 
testify, and therefore open up the grounds for their cross-examination. They point to historical legal 
traditions that also legitimize this tension in order to justify its continued practice. This same logic (if a 
defendant gains a privilege commonly associated with possible costs, he cannot simply avoid the cost), 
when applied to the issue of bifurcated trial, elicited a similar conclusion. If the defendant decides to 
speak on the issue of guilt at a unitary trial, he incurs a risk of leaving an unfavorable impression for 
sentencing; however, this does not make the entire sentencing system unconstitutional. Thus, “We 
conclude that the policies of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination are not offended when a 
defendant in a capital case yields to the press to testify on the issue of punishment at the risk of 
damaging his case on guilt.” 
 
Arguments in McGautha Supreme Court opinions 
What is striking about this decision is that the majority Justices acknowledged that, while the 
bifurcated jury-trial may be the fairest, the unitary jury-trial is nonetheless constitutional. Furthermore, 
the Court hardly considered cases involving capital punishment distinguishable from other forms of 
punishment. Furthermore, they also left notable discretion to the jury in “reflect[ing] ‘the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,’ ” a discretion that they would come 
to severely challenge only a year later in Furman v. Georgia.   
Because of these particular arguments, the three main arguments of punishment exhibited in 
McGautha v. California concern those of procedural deficiencies, cost, and retribution. 
Procedural Deficiencies. The strongest argument in McGautha concerns the procedural deficiencies 
that Crampton and McGautha claim are so inherently unfair. The Justices seemed to indicate that there 
were no such procedural deficiencies. The Justices never stated this directly, but one can easily identify 
this frame from the Justices’ seeming indifference towards granting defendants the fairest possible trial. 
This can be inferred from two premises offered by the Court: that a defendant must choose and bear 
the consequences of his defense strategy, and that, while a bifurcated trial may be fairest, it is not a right 
 17 
of the punished to obtain the most fair trial. All that due process requires is that a defendant gets access 
to a constitutional trial; even if a fairer type of trial exists, the Constitution does not compel its use.  
To say that the two-stage jury trial in the English-Connecticut style [i.e., the bifurcated trial] is 
probably the fairest, as some commentators and courts have suggested, and with which we 
might well agree were the matter before us in a legislative or rulemaking context, is a far cry 
from a constitutional determination that this method of handling the problem is compelled by 
the Fourteen Amendment. 
 
To defend this point of view, the Court pointed to other long-standing courtroom traditions 
concerning due process. The Court distinguished Crampton’s claim from the case of United States v. 
Simmons, where the Court ruled that using testimony elicited in unsuccessful pretrial motions (possible 
testimony that disadvantages the defendant) would be unlawful because this created “an intolerable 
tension between constitutional rights”—the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and the 
Fourth Amendment right to contest and fight back against unlawful search and seizures. The Court, 
however, distinguished the Simmons case from Crampton’s because the right to a bifurcated trial is not 
something guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and so there is no tension between a Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination and the implementation of a unitary trial.  
Additionally, the majority Justices cited analogous common criminal practices: defendants who 
testify on their own behalf generally waive their rights against being cross-examined (since they have 
presumably weighed the benefits of testifying and being cross-examined before deciding to testify). 
They argued that this tension (the defendant must carefully weigh his defense strategy, lest he loses one 
protection in the pursuit of another privilege) has not been considered cruel: “It is not thought overly 
harsh in such situations to require that the determination whether to waive privilege take into account 
the matters which may be brought out on cross-examination. It is also generally recognized that a 
defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf may be impeached by proof of prior convictions or 
the like.” Further language used by the Justices indicates that those procedural measures are indeed 
“harsh” but not “overly harsh”: “It is not thought overly harsh in such situations to require that the 
determination whether to waive privilege take into account the matters which may be brought out on 
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cross-examination. It is also generally recognized that a defendant who takes the stand in his own 
behalf may be impeached by proof of prior convictions or the like.” The Justices seemed to reason that, 
being a defendant in a case entailing capital punishment, all that the defendant deserves is a trial that 
does not violate constitutional provisions; he does not deserve anything that would be definitively 
better for him than the lowest qualifying kind of Due Process.  
Cost. The Court’s decision was also practical in considering economic repercussions, because the 
second-most prominent argument that the majority offers to justify not recommending an overhaul of 
nationwide standard-less death penalties is based on a cost argument. The Court stated:  
With recidivism the major problem that it is, substantial changes in trial procedure in countless 
local courts around the country would be required were this Court to sustain the contentions 
made by these petitioners. This we are unwilling to do. To take such a step would be quite 
beyond the pale of this Court’s proper function in our federal system. 
 
In addition to their earlier admission (bifurcated trials are fairer for defendants), the Court gave weight 
to utilitarian considerations in the sense that the cost of revamping the criminal justice laws across the 
nation would be less desirable than keeping the current system of standard-less jury.  
Retribution. There are two specific ways that the majority opinion considered punishment as a 
form of retribution. Both are found within a discussion of using jury discretion to administer the death 
penalty. First, the Justices wrote of the necessity of using community judgment (jury determinations of 
punishment) to establish links between the judicial system and community members at large:  
One of the most important functions any jury can perform in making such a selection is to 
maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system—a link without 
which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect “the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.” 
 
The idea of retribution was introduced in its counterpart, “mercy.” The Court cited an older opinion 
from Skinner v. Oklahoma, which claimed that the original purpose of jury trials was to provide for 
mercy in punishment. The Court denied that that the current state of finding punishment has strayed 
from it, and even wrote that “in light of history, experience, and the present limitations of human 
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knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury 
the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution.”  
 
Additional notes  
It is especially important to note that the Court made no distinction between capital 
punishment and any other kinds of punishment. (“Nor does the fact that capital, as opposed to any 
other, sentencing is in issue seem to us to distinguish this case.”) This lack of distinction, while not 
neatly confined to any one frame of punishment, will be retired in future discussion.  
  
TABLE 1 
McGautha v. California (1971)4 
 
Vote: 5 – 4 
Decision: It is not 
unconstitutional to institute the 
death penalty without giving 
governing instructions to the jury. 
 
Frames from Court opinion:   
1. Procedural Deficiencies 
2. Cost 
3. Retribution 
 
 
 
  
                                                
4 See Appendix B for an explanation of the Tables included in this paper. 
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Furman v. Georgia: (1972) 
Case background 
The Furman decision (408 U. S. 417) combined the petitions of three convicted criminals: 
Furman, convicted of murdering the father of five children after breaking into the victim’s home, and 
two others convicted of rape during the course of robbery. With a 5-4 vote breakdown that reversed 
the sentence in all three cases, and with each member of the Court writing his own opinion, the Furman 
decision has been inducted into the Supreme Court hall of fame as one of the most divisive and 
extensively argued cases in its history, and for years after, one of the longest opinions ever rendered. 
The decision also had the effect of nullifying the capital punishment statutes of thirty-nine states (those 
that permitted the death penalty) as well as relevant provisions of the Criminal Code of the United 
States and of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. For four years after the Furman decision, states held 
off on executions until Gregg v. Georgia was granted certiorari upon the Court’s evaluations of the 
reformed criminal justice statutes of some of the states impacted. 
In Furman, the Court granted certiorari to determine whether the application of the death 
penalty in those three cases constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The majority found that the 
death penalty in the three cases at hand violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment. The reasons for their findings were far from uniform, however (recall the plurality 
of opinions for this case).  
Five Justices concurred in the majority ruling, which reversed the lower courts’ decisions 
(Douglas, White, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall). In doing so, they cited the argument from arbitrary 
application, lack of a credible deterrent effect, and the racial and economic inequalities embodied in the 
criminal justice system. The concurring opinions also relied heavily on the standards created in Trop v. 
Dulles, the landmark case in which the Court found that the penalty of expatriation for the capital 
offense of desertion during wartime was cruel and unusual. Trop established the standard that the cruel 
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and unusual punishment clause was tied to “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society,” which the Court uses in this case to justify the reversal of the lower courts’ decisions.  
 Dissenters (Blackmun, Rehnquist, Powell, Burger), barring personal objections the practice, 
opined that the sporadic nature of a jury’s death sentence recommendation indicated that due 
deliberation and consideration is consistently given to whether the punishment is cruel and unusual, 
and that abolitionists of the death penalty have not conclusively proved that there is no deterrence 
effect to the practice. The dissenting Justices rely on using historical context of the Framers’ era to 
illustrate the capital punishment was expressly allowed by the Constitution, and should continue to 
exist. Additionally, the dissenting Justices point to the McGautha decision, rendered only one year 
earlier, to point out what they believe is a demonstration of inconsistent ruling and lack of judicial 
restraint on the part of the majority. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger wrote that “it would be 
disingenuous to suggest that today’s ruling has done anything else than overrule McGautha in the guise 
of an Eighth Amendment adjudication.” He especially refuted the claims made by his concurring 
colleagues, saying that “the five opinions . . . share a willingness to make sweeping factual assertions, 
unsupported by empirical data” especially as they concern the prevalence of caprice/bias in actual 
executions and also the efficacy of deterrence.  
 
Arguments in Furman Supreme Court opinions  
The strongest frames in Furman are those of caprice/bias, deterrence, and retribution, with the 
potency of their prevalence.  
Caprice/bias. Although Justices Brennan and Marshall stated their outright rejection of the death 
penalty as a practice, the other three concurring Justices did not go as far in their opinions. Their 
objections to the death penalty were on the grounds of the arbitrariness of its application, based on 
considerations of race and socioeconomic status. This determination to eliminate the elements of 
caprice and bias from executions can be found in the opinion of Justice Douglass, who believed that 
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the “cruel and unusual” standard of the Eight Amendment required legislatures to write laws that are 
“evenhanded, nonselective, and non-arbitrary.” The vice in applying a penalty, he said, lay not so much 
in the punishment, but in the irregularity of its application: being poor, black, young, and ignorant are 
all factors that predispose one to execution. 
Indeed, Justice Brennan’s strongest objection to the death penalty was also on the grounds of 
its arbitrary application. He scathingly wrote: “When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial 
number of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is inescapable that it is being inflicted 
arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery system.” Also commenting on the arbitrariness 
of exacting the penalty, Justice White famously wrote:  
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is 
cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, 
many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random 
handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed. My concurring Brothers 
have demonstrated that, if any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be 
sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race. 
 
Interestingly, the dissenting opinions are relatively quiet on this issue.  
Deterrence. The frame of deterrence is hotly debated in both the concurring and the dissenting 
opinions. Deterrence was discussed both in its specific effects (as it prevented the same criminal from 
repeating the crime) and for its general effects (disincentivizing the population at large from committing 
a capital offense). Those in the majority tended to talk about the lack of credible deterrence in 
imposition of the death penalty; not everyone considered crimes rationally, no empirical evidence 
showed there to be a deterrent effect generated by the death penalty, and the sporadic imposition of the 
sentence made it even more unlikely that it served as an effective deterrent. Those dissenting pointed 
out that there was no evidence that the death penalty had no effect, and argued that the Constitution 
did not mandate the use of the most effective deterrent—that is, using a less-than-absolutely effective 
deterrent (such as the death penalty) did not violate the Constitution. Most Justices devoted time to 
either bolstering the claim from deterrence (or lack thereof) but neither the dissenters nor the majority 
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found the deterrence argument compelling enough on its own, to support the case for maintaining or 
disbarring the death penalty institution outright.  
Retribution. There was considerable conflicting opinion even among the concurring Justices as to 
what role retribution should play in punishment. Justice Stewart (and to some extent Justice Marshall) 
suggests that the entire purpose of punishment is to satisfy the requirements of civility and retribution, 
while others such as Justice Brennan dismisses retribution as reeking “naked vengeance.” Regardless of 
their appraisal of retribution as a frame, the Justices devoted significant time to discussing whether the 
death penalty could be upheld for the purpose of retribution, to an inconclusive end.   
 
 Additional notes 
While the three main frames of this case are those of caprice/bias, deterrence, and retribution, 
Justice Marshall writes in his concurring opinion all of the frames that the Court could have 
entertained. They are provided here to give a sense of what frames the Court believed it could select 
from. They were that of retribution, deterrence (general and specific), cost, eugenics, and incentivizing 
guilty plea. The latter two frames he dismissed outright as being unconstitutional and cruel.  
Gregg v. Georgia: (1976) 
TABLE 2 
Furman v. Georgia (1972) 
 
Vote: 5 – 4 
Decision: The arbitrariness of 
imposition enabled by current death 
penalty statutes renders practice 
unconstitutional. (Effectively 
institutes moratorium on executions). 
 
Frames from Court Opinion: 
1. Caprice/bias  
2. Deterrence  
3. Retribution 
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Case background 
 Four years after the moratorium on all capital punishment sentences established in Furman, five 
states submitted their newly-crafted death penalties for Supreme Court review. While two Justices in 
the Furman majority found the death penalty unconstitutional, three of the Justices indicated that, if 
reformed to give the jury less “untrammeled discretion” and amended to bar mandatory death penalty 
sentencing, then the death penalty may still be implemented. These state legislatures (Oklahoma, 
Louisiana, North Carolina, Texas, and Georgia, from which the name of the case is derived) set out to 
devise sentencing guidelines to fit the narrow requirement that the Court established. 
 Gregg v. Georgia (428 U. S. 195) represented only one of the five new statutes submitted to the 
Court for consideration in the 1976 term, but the overall ruling that resulted is generally consolidated 
into and referred to as Gregg, and as such, the discussion below will focus on but will not be limited to 
solely the case facts of Gregg v. Georgia.  
Georgia’s new death penalty statute featured a bifurcated trial, in which only six kinds of crimes 
were eligible for death penalty consideration (murder, kidnapping where the victim is harmed, armed 
robbery, rape, treason, airplane hijacking). Furthermore, one of ten aggravating factors (e.g. murder 
committed for money, murder of police officer, murder during rape, offense was outrageous or 
wantonly vile) had to be demonstrated in order to reach the next phase of sentencing. If and only if an 
aggravating factor was established can the jury weigh and recommend the death sentence. Finally, after 
each death sentence, an automatic appellate review was triggered, where among other things, the 
presiding judge had to fill out a questionnaire to evaluate whether prejudicing factors such as race 
played a part in sentencing procedures.  
 It was this with new statute that Georgia sought to impose the death penalty on Troy Gregg, a 
man found guilty of murdering and robbing two men with whom he had hitchhiked. Gregg alleged that 
he killed the two victims out of self-defense, but the jury was unconvinced. The Supreme Court, 
however, seemed to be convinced that Georgia’s new statute no longer contained the “fatal flaws” that 
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made its statute unconstitutional in 1972, upholding the Georgia statute and affirming the judgment 
seven to two.  
 Justice Stewart penned the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Berger and Justice 
Rehnquist, and decided that the fatal errors of the previous Georgian statute (that of too much jury 
discretion and arbitrariness in application of the death penalty) had been sufficiently addressed by the 
new statute. It also recognized that retribution and possibility of deterrence are the only valid 
considerations for a legislature to weigh for the use of the death penalty. Their decision touched on the 
historical use of the death penalty (and its explicit mention in the Fifth Amendment), and went on to 
examine Gregg’s claim that allowing juries to use mercy in their deliberations would introduce undue 
arbitrariness into the criminal sentencing process. The Court wrote that “nothing in any of our cases 
suggests that the decision to afford an individual defendant mercy violates the Constitution.” Justice 
White, writing in concurrence, additionally argues that Gregg’s assertion that prosecutors behave in a 
standard-less fashion in deciding which cases to try and which cases to offer plea bargains for is 
ungrounded, saying that prosecutors rely on a threshold of sufficient evidence and sufficient severity of 
crime to guide their prosecutorial work.  
 
Arguments in Gregg Supreme Court opinions 
There are four strong frames in this case, with a tie for second place. The main frame is that of 
caprice/bias, while deterrence and retribution come in second and desert comes in last.  
Caprice/bias. It is unsurprising that the strongest frame of this case, since the states submitted 
statutes aimed at correcting aspects that the Court found to have been riddled by arbitrariness and 
untrammelled discretion of the jury. After all, the state of Georgia took this case to the Court to 
demonstrate just how its newly-implemented safeguards minimize undue arbitrariness, or “passion, 
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor” based on race or socioeconomic status. Arguments from the 
caprice/bias frame constitute the bulk of the majority opinion, and also that of the concurring opinion.  
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After a thorough explanation and qualification of the Georgia death penalty statute, Justice 
Stewart wrote: “In summary, the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be 
imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that 
the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance.” His opinion further indicates that 
minimizing the possibility that caprice and arbitrariness in trial procedure pronouncement of the death 
penalty was a necessary condition for the Court to lift the ban on a state’s ability to execute, but, 
depending on the particular statute in question, minimization may not have been a sufficient condition 
(note that the same day that Gregg was affirmed, the Court affirmed the death penalty statutes of Florida 
and Texas but rejected the statutes from North Carolina and Oklahoma).  
 The concurring opinion also discussed the questions raised from a consideration of arbitrary 
procedure: after a lengthy repudiation of the petitioner’s claims (that prosecutors behave in a standard-
less fashion in deciding which cases to try, that the new statute was still too vague in jury instruction), 
Justice White concluded that the new Georgia statutes sufficiently minimize the risk of arbitrary death 
penalty implementation: 
Indeed, if the Georgia Supreme Court properly performs the task assigned to it under the 
Georgia statutes, [in its appellate review function after a jury-finding for death] death sentences 
imposed for discriminatory reasons or wantonly or freakishly for any given category of crime 
will be set side. Petitioner has wholly failed establish . . . that the Georgia Supreme Court . . . is 
incapable of performing its task adequately in all cases, and this Court should not assume that it 
did not do so. 
 
From the above quote alone, one can see that the opinion is riddled with words associated with the 
caprice/bias frame, such as “wanton,” “freakish,” and “discriminatory.” The Justices in the concurring 
opinion, on the other hand, seemed to give the statutes the benefit of the doubt, their faith in 
implementation of the death penalty procedures apparently restored.  
Deterrence and retribution. The two frames tied for second strongest frame are often mentioned in 
the same breath in Gregg. The majority opinion reads, “The death penalty is said to serve two principal 
social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.” The two frames 
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are equally central to the majority opinion. Their strength remains tied, for deterrence is further 
discussed in one dissenting opinion, and retribution in that of another, with no overlap. Justice 
Brennan’s strong dissent featured the frame of deterrence (“death is not only an unusually severe 
punishment…it serves no penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment”) and 
remained quiet on the question of retribution. Justice Marshall’s dissent strongly condemned 
legitimizing retribution as a justification behind capital punishment, saying, “The other principal 
purpose said to be served by the death penalty is retribution. . . it is this notion that I find to be the 
most disturbing aspect of today’s unfortunate decisions.”  
Procedural Deficiencies. The Court revealed that it believed that convicted criminals did not deserve 
to be subjected to the least severe penalty possible—even if there was a less severe punishment that 
would serve the same penal or deterrent function.  This attitude was previously adopted by the Court in 
McGautha, when the Court essentially declined to force states to use bifurcated trials even when a 
unitary trial sometimes was considered to be fairer. Textually, the procedural deficiencies arguments can 
be espied in Justice Stewart’s opinion: “We may not require the legislature to select the least severe 
penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime 
involved.” The Court here was more or less stating that while it recognizes that potentially less 
“extreme,” “irrevocable,” and “severe” punishments may achieve the same ends as the death penalty, 
but that the Court has no policy incentive or Constitutional obligation to overturn decisions made by 
the state legislature. The Court would later abolish the death penalty for mentally retarded criminals and 
juveniles alike on the grounds that the punishment is too severe for the crime, whatever it is, 
demonstrating that it is legally capable of forcing states to at least rule out the most “severe” penalty 
possible.  
Additional notes  
The Gregg decision changed the game in more ways than just lifting the ban on the death 
penalty. It fortified the consideration of proportionality of the punishment to the crime as a 
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consideration compelled by the “cruel and unusual standard.” “It is clear from the foregoing precedents 
[established in Furman, which made proportionality a controlling factor in deciding what was cruel and 
unusual] that the Eight Amendment has not been regarded as a static concept.” The criteria of 
proportionality established in Gregg would eventually be applied in Atkins and Roper to abolish the 
penalty for mentally retarded and juvenile defendants, on the grounds that the two classes of people 
had diminished maturing and culpability, which made the death penalty categorically disproportionate 
to the crimes they committed.  
Additionally, the opinion in Gregg opened the door to judicial interpretations of “standards of 
decency” (as opposed to the Court’s deferring to legislative judgment). The majority opinion by Justice 
Stewart opined that “legislative measures adopted by the people’s chosen representatives weigh heavily 
in ascertaining contemporary standards of decency.” Whereas, prior to Gregg, the Court exclusively 
deferred to the states to create death penalty statutes, it now affirmed the its right to evaluate and 
interpret the existence of state statutes as objective indicia on society’s evolving standards of decency. 
Essentially, while the Court could not legislate against the death penalty, it could decide when they 
perceive a national consensus against the penalty. This judicial interpretation would be expanded after 
Gregg, with the Court relying on this interpretive power to uphold the execution of mentally retarded 
defendants in 1989 on the grounds that not enough legislatures had banned the practice, and eventually 
using it to overturn that same decision in 2002 by deciding that enough legislatures had banned it to 
signal a nation-wide outcry against it. For both issues, it is the Court which decides at which point there 
exists a national concensus. 
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TABLE 3 
Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 
 
Vote: 7 - 2  
Decision: The new Death Penalty 
statutes in question are 
constitutional. (Ends moratorium 
on executions imposed by 
Furman) 
Frames from Court Opinion:  
1. Caprice/bias 
2. Deterrence/Retribution 
3. Desert 
 
 
Set 2: Execution of the Mentally Retarded: Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) and Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 
Preliminary Remarks 
One notable trend apparent in the next two sets of cases (Sets 2 and 3) surrounding the cases of 
execution of the mentally retarded and juveniles, respectively, is the interrelatedness of the issues. 
Besides the obvious chronological overlap of the cases (the Penry and Stanford decisions were rendered 
on the same day), there is additionally much cross-pollination between the issues of mental retardation 
and juvenile execution. One such aspect stems from the general way mental retardation is described; the 
use of language such as “the defendant has the mental age of a seven year old child” inevitably 
compares the impairments of social and intellectual development in mentally retarded persons to that 
of a juvenile. As far as the Supreme Court is concerned, the decision in Penry finds steadfast rationale in 
the lessened culpability argument that was developed in Thompson v. Oklahoma, an earlier Court case that 
ruled on the constitutionality of executing criminals under the age of 15. The Court’s opinions in both 
Stanford and Penry reference each other as precedent. Additionally, the 2002 Atkins decision played a 
very significant role in the later Roper decision, rendered in 2005.  
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Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 
Case background 
 The case of Penry v. Lynaugh involved a defendant, Johnny Paul Penry, who was sentenced to 
death in Texas for the 1979 rape and murder of Pamela Carpenter. Penry, twenty-two at the time, had 
an IQ between 50 and 63 and suffered from “mild to moderate retardation.” Penry had entered Ms. 
Carpenter’s home, brutally raped her, and then stabbed her with a pair of scissors, which according to 
his confession, was done not out of self-defense, but to prevent Ms. Carpenter from identifying him. 
He was found competent to stand trial in Texas, where the jury, using the jury instructions for the 
Texas Special issues framework (in which if they answered yes to three question on aggravating 
questions posed, the death penalty would be applied for the defendant), he was sentenced to death.  
 Penry appealed, arguing two things: 1.) that Texas’s strict sentencing framework for capital 
crimes prevented the jury from considering the mitigating factors of his mental condition, and from 
expressing its “reasoned moral response” to that evidence in rendering its sentencing decision; 2.) that 
it is categorically cruel and unusual to impose the death penalty on mentally retarded defendants. The 
Court, in a unanimous opinion penned by Justice O’Connor (with three additional opinions concurring 
in part and dissenting in part), accepted his arguments on the first count, but refused to accept a holistic 
prohibition on executions for mentally retarded.  
 It is important to note that the Texas statute in question was one of the first death penalty 
statutes approved (on the same day as the Georgia statute in question during Gregg) after the 
moratorium imposed through Furman was lifted. The Texas Special Issues framework made it such that 
if a jury answered yes to three questions on aggravating factors (1. Whether the defendant’s conduct 
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that death would result; 2. Whether 
there was a probability that he would be a continuing threat to society; 3. Whether the killing was 
unreasonable in response to provocation by the victim) then the death penalty was automatically 
applied; if any of the questions were answered with no, then the defendant would be subjected to life 
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imprisonment instead. The Court found in favor of Penry in that the strict three-issue framework did 
not permit for the jury to act and meaningfully weigh the individual mitigating factors of the case 
against the aggravating factors enumerated, and therefore his case was to be retried. However, the 
Court did not find that mental retarded offenders were categorically exempted from the death penalty. 
Justice O’Connor concluded her opinion with the same kind of open-ended dismissal that concluded 
Stanford: “While a national consensus against execution of the mentally retarded may someday emerge… 
there is insufficient evidence of such a consensus today.”  
 
Arguments in Penry Supreme Court opinions 
The three strongest frames in Penry are that of retribution, historical practice, and rehabilitation, 
in that order.  
Retribution. Unsurprisingly, the retributive frame is the most robust frame witnessed, for much 
of the juridical debate in Penry focused on the proportionality of the crime to the punishment, especially 
as to whether mental retardation diminished the culpability of a defendant. “Underlying Lockett and 
Eddings” (two relevant cases from 1978 and 1982 respectively, referenced in Penry to clear up the 
constitutionality of the new Gregg statutes) “is the principle that punishment should be directly related 
to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant . . . defendants who commit criminal acts that are 
attributed to…mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse” 
(O’Connor, citing California v. Brown (1987)). Furthermore, in considering the categorical ban of the use 
of the death penalty on mentally retarded defendants, Justice O’Connor relates in Part C of the majority 
opinion Penry’s disproportionality claim that “execution of a mentally retarded person like himself with 
a reasoning capacity of approximately a 7-year-old would be cruel and unusual because it is 
disproportionate to his degree of personal culpability.”  
Finally, the retributive frame is explicitly examined in Justice Brennan’s dissent, in which he 
reiterates the Stanford decision “requir[ing] that a punishment further the penal goals of deterrence or 
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retribution.” While he only spends a paragraph addressing the former, he dedicates almost seven 
paragraphs discussing the shortcomings of the latter goal, decrying that the execution of those that 
“inevitably lack the cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity to act with the …culpability associated with 
the death penalty.”  
Historical Practice. The second strongest frame is the defense from the majority opinion of the 
historical practice of execution for those deemed to be “idiots.” Not only does the Court dismiss 
contemporary opinion polling as a means of gauging societal consensus against the execution of 
mentally retarded defendants, but it also refers to both a historical ban on the common law tradition of 
banning execution of “idiots” and “lunatics,” while nonetheless arguing that there should be no 
categorical ban on executing the mentally retarded. The Court cites Blackstone, writing in the mid 
1700’s: “idiots and lunatics are not changeable for their own acts, if committed when under these 
incapacities…a total idiocy…excuses from the guilt, and of course from the punishment, of any 
criminal action.”  
Yet, despite a lengthy discussion of historical practices of granting mercy to “lunatics” (the 
modern day “mentally ill”) and “idiots” (the modern day “mentally retarded”), the Court says that 
because the jury found Penry competent enough to stand trial, and presumed him to have the “ability 
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding,” he was aware of the 
punishment he was liable to suffer, and therefore, under a precedent set in Ford v. Wainwright (1986), 
could not be excluded from capital sentencing on the grounds of mental retardation alone.  
Rehabilitation. A discussion of the third strongest frame, that of rehabilitation, explains the 
incredible catch-22 that faced mentally retarded defendants sentenced for capital crimes under the 
Texas statute. Recall the second question posed by the Texas Special Issues framework: is there 
probability that the defendant would be a “continuing threat to society”? As the jury and the Court 
noted, “Penry’s mental retardation indicated that one effect of his retardation is his inability to learn 
from his mistakes.” His mental retardation almost automatically assures that a jury would find him less 
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likely to be reformed and therefore less eligible for future rehabilitation. Therefore, the Court says, 
“Penry’s mental retardation and history of abuse is thus a two-edged sword: it may diminish his 
blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates that there is a probability that he will be dangerous in 
the future.”  
 
Additional notes. 
The desert frame and the deterrence frame were also employed in this opinion, albeit not as 
prominently as were the other three frames. Justice O’Connor explicitly (but briefly) discusses the 
deservingness of punishments by siding with Penry on the flawed nature of the Texas Special Issues 
framework: “a reasonable juror could well have believed that there was no vehicle for expressing the 
view that Penry did not deserve to be sentenced to death based upon his mitigating evidence.” The 
deterrence frame was also pithily discussed in Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion and then reiterated 
in Justice Brennan’s dissent: both addressed retribution and deterrence as the only two purposes 
justifying punishment. While the retributive element received a lot of Courtly attention, discussion of 
the deterrence frame was left fallow by Justice O’Connor and easily dismissed by Justice Brennan 
(“Killing mentally retarded offenders does not measurably contribute to the goal of deterrence”).  
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TABLE 4 
Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 
 
Vote: Unanimous, with 3 opinions 
concurring and dissenting in part 
Decision: Execution of the mentally 
retarded is not unconstitutional; 
not providing jury instructions that 
allow for consideration of 
adequate mitigating factors is 
unconstitutional. 
 
Frames in Court Opinion:  
1. Retribution  
2. Historical Practice 
3. Rehabilitation  
Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 
Case background  
Thirteen years after the decision in Penry, the Court decided to re-examine the second question 
posed by Penry: whether executions of mentally retarded persons are “cruel and unusual punishments” 
prohibited by the Eight Amendment. In this case, the petitioner, Daryl Atkins, was sentenced to death 
in Virginia. With the help of an accomplice, Atkins abducted his victim, an airman from Langley Air 
Force Base, forced him to withdraw $200 from an ATM, and despite the victim’s pleas to leave him 
unharmed, fatally shot the victim eight times. His accomplice, being sound of mind, offered a much 
more cogent and credible testimony than Atkins, who was not only found to have an IQ of 59 (making 
him mildly to moderately retarded), but also to have an extensive criminal history that ranged from 
assault, robbery, and maiming.  
The majority opinion was delivered by Justice Stevens and represented six Justices; two separate 
dissenting opinions were penned by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, with respective joinings 
in from the other, as well as the joining of Justice Thomas. The majority ruled that since the Penry 
decision, there has been a demonstrated shift in national consensus against the use of the death penalty 
on mentally retarded defendants, evidenced not only by newly-enacted state-level legislative bans but 
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also by the paltry number of such executions carried out since Penry (only five in thirteen years). The 
majority notes that compared to the sole legislative ban on executing mentally retarded criminals 
(Maryland) at the time that Penry was decided, there was now 18 such statutes; this, Justice Stevens 
writes, “provides powerful evidence that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as 
categorically less culpable than the average criminal” and that “it is not so much the number of these 
States that is significant, but the consistence of the direction of change.” It is also this “consistency of 
the direction of change” that Justice Scalia lambasts.  
 
Arguments in Atkins Supreme Court opinions 
The three strongest arguments in Atkins are retribution, deterrence, and international trends.  
Retribution. Unsurprisingly, the issues debated through the retributive frame are similar to the 
ones espoused in Penry; the difference is, however, that the Penry ruling is overturned. The argument 
from retribution espoused by the majority is that there is categorically a discrepancy in proportionality 
between the mentally retarded defendant’s culpability and the irrevocable punishment of death. This 
argument was explicitly rejected by the majority in Penry, but the Court somehow adopts a precedent 
from Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) which allowed the Court to judge that “if the culpability of the average 
murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the state, the lesser culpability 
of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution.” Since the majority 
opinion in Atkins essentially negated the retributive reasoning it found inadequate in Penry, not much 
discussion will be devoted to a rehashing of the frame. 
Deterrence. Again, the frame of deterrence, as it applies to mentally retarded criminals, has been 
discussed in Penry, but echoed again in Atkins. It is ranked as the second strongest because it was both 
the second strongest frame in the majority opinion, but also the only other frame evoked in the 
majority opinion as well as in another dissenting opinion.  
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Together with retribution, deterrence constitutes one of the two pillars of the justification 
behind any instance of government-sanctioned punishment. The majority argued that because of the 
diminished mental capabilities of mentally retarded persons, the deterrence effect could not be said to 
be a valid justification of the death penalty for that class of people: 
The theory of deterrence in capital sentencing is predicated upon the notion that the increased 
severity of the punishment will inhibit criminal actors from carrying out murderous conduct. 
Yet it is the same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make these defendants less morally 
culpable-for example, the diminished ability to understand and process information, to learn 
from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses-that also make it less 
likely that they can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a 
result, control their conduct based upon that information. 
 
Justice Scalia dismissed this view (with little factual or statistical evidence) by saying that since it was 
unlikely that no mentally retarded people at all were deterred by the penalty, then surely the deterrent 
effect of a penalty is “adequately vindicated.”  
International Trends. The international trends frame is the third strongest, because while it was not 
mentioned at all in the majority opinion, it was prominently featured in both the dissenting opinions. 
Both Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinions find great fault in what they 
perceive as “the Court’s decision to place weight on foreign laws…in reaching its conclusion” (the 
European Union submitted an amicus brief in favor of abolishing the practice, in part summarizing the 
prohibitions from many of its constituent nations). Justice Scalia is more vocal in his denunciation of 
the Court’s consideration of international standards on the practice, writing, “irrelevant are the practices 
of the ‘world community,’ whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people.” 
 
Additional notes 
The vehicle through which the Court has been able to limit the death penalty since the 1970’s 
has not been through a shift in Court sentiment about the penalty, but in fact, through the Court’s 
redefinition of what constitutes the “objective indicia” that indicate an evolving national consensus. 
Recall that it was not until Gregg in 1976 that the Court looked to state statutes as indicia of national 
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consensus; it is in Atkins that the infrequency of executions of X class of people tentatively becomes 
another such indicia. As one can imagine, the establishment of frequency of use as an indicia was a 
controversial issue among the Justices, hence why a significant part of the majority opinion is devoted 
to explaining and contextualizing the reading of such a consensus and why Justice Scalia’s dissent is 
primarily focused on rebutting such a reading of indicia (“Given that 14 years ago all the death penalty 
statutes included the mentally retarded, any change was bound to be in the one direction the Court finds 
significant enough to overcome the lack of real consensus.”) As such, this case concentrated as much 
on justifying punishments as well as on the technical ways through which the Court interprets and acts 
upon the consensus surrounding the punishments, making the frames not quite as focal in the overall 
Court decision.  
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Stanford v. Kentucky was decided on June 25, 1989. The case combined two petitions from two 
minors who were convicted for capital offenses, one in Missouri and one in Kentucky. For both 
petitioners, state law forced the juvenile court system to expel the petitioners and try them under the 
adult courts. This was due to the severity and maliciousness of their crimes, as well as repeated failed 
efforts at rehabilitation under the juvenile court system. In the adult criminal justice system, both 
petitioners were given the death penalty and subsequently filed for appeals on the grounds that they had 
a constitutional right to rehabilitation under the juvenile court system.  
In a 5-4 decision, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Rehnquist, White and O’Connor (partly) ruled that 
the imposition of the death penalty on criminals who committed their crimes at either age 16 or 17 was 
not unconstitutional. Justice O’Connor departed from Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in that she 
believes that, though not applicable in this case, proportionality analysis on the blameworthiness of a 
defendant is something that the Court has an obligation to weigh, and which may meaningfully 
delineate the difference between adults and juveniles. Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent 
comprising of Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens instead opine that juvenile execution under the 
age of 18 is unconstitutional. The dissenting Justices point out that legitimate purposes of punishment 
(limited by Gregg to retribution and deterrence purposes only) are not satisfied in the case of juvenile 
executions.  
 
Arguments in Stanford Supreme Court opinions 
The strongest frames in Stanford are that of historical practice, retribution, and desert, in that 
order.  
Historical Practice. According to the majority Justices, there are two ways to prove the 
constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty; to determine whether it was permitted during the drafting 
of the Eighth Amendment, and to determine whether evolving standards of decency in contemporary 
society prohibit its use. The majority opinion talked at length about how, in light of historical practice 
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and common law history the death penalty was deemed appropriate for those over the age of  who 
committed capital crimes “and theoretically permitted capital punishment to be imposed on anyone 
over the age of seven.” The justification from history is the strongest defense the Court offers for why 
it is not unconstitutional to continue executing minors under the age of eighteen.  
Retribution. The retributive argument features more prominently in the dissenting opinion than 
in the majority opinion. While the majority opinion only declines to engage the retributive argument, 
Justice Brennan’s spends the majority of his decision in arguing that, from a retribution perspective, 
juvenile executions are unjustified. The retributive frame encompasses the idea of proportionality 
“given the culpability of the offender,” as well as that of mitigating and aggravating factors. Justice 
Brennan writes, “the diminished levels of responsibility” that society attributes to juveniles “reflects the 
simple truth derived from communal experience that juveniles as a class have not the level of 
maturation and responsibility that we presume in adults and consider desirable for full participation in 
the rights and duties of modern life.” Based on the retributive argument for capital punishment, 
blameworthiness, as determined by maturity and responsibility, is categorically not applicable to the 
juvenile population, and renders them untouchable through the retributive argument for punishment.  
Procedural deficiencies. The procedural deficiencies argument is infused into Stanford through two 
distinct ideas: first, the Court affirms the decisions of the juvenile courts in both petitioners’ cases to 
refer petitioners to the adult court system based on the “viciousness, force, and violence” of their 
crimes. In leaving unchallenged the decision of lower appellate and juvenile Courts that the defendants 
were “aware of [their] actions and could distinguish right from wrong,” the Court asserted that the 
defendants had no right to the rehabilitation juvenile courts may offer, but were rightly referred to the 
heightened series of punishments available to juries in adult courts.  
The Court’s second rejection of the petitioner’s claim that there exist procedural deficiencies in 
their state criminal justice systems is found in the majority’s opinion. The majority opinion indicates 
that the petitioners hold a “heavy burden” to establish a national consensus against the juvenile death 
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penalty. The Court could be thought of as saying, if juveniles deserved not to get the death penalty, let 
them prove it.  
 
Additional notes 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion affirms using the frames of historical practice to justify 
execution of minors, while rejecting deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution as frames for the debate.   
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion makes an explicit prohibition of using indicia such as public 
opinion, interest and political group opinion, examination of actual “application of the laws” of 
execution, and “proportionality” analysis to determine the constitutionality of the death penalty. 
Proportionality analysis, which he indicates was correctly applied in Enmund v. Florida and Coker v. 
Georgia and which relies on determining the punishment based on the blameworthiness of the criminal, 
was not applicable to the juvenile death penalty issue because the subjective application of 
proportionality needs to be applied by society at large and not by the Justices alone. On the statistical 
evidence noting a lack of the “application of the laws,” that is, the application of the death penalty to 
those under the age of 18, the Court says, “these statistics… carry little significance.” The prohibitions 
described by Justice Scalia are directly utilized as compelling indicia for the abolition of juvenile 
executions in Roper v. Simmons. 
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Roper v. Simmons (2005) 
Case history 
In Roper v. Simmons (2005), the Supreme Court overturned the decision made in Stanford v. 
Kentucky (1989), making unconstitutional the use of the death penalty for those under the age of 18 at 
the time of the crime.  The majority cite a “national consensus” that had dramatically shifted since 
Stanford, based on both “objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in pertinent legislative 
enactments and state practice” as well as the Court’s “own judgment … on the question of the 
acceptability of the death penalty.”  
The case at hand arose out of Missouri, where then seventeen-year-old Christopher Simmons 
planned and conducted the murder of a woman named Shirley Cook. Simmons had two underage 
accomplices with him, one of whom did not participate in the actual crime and testified against him. 
Simmons and his accomplice planned a break-in, burglary, and murder, which involved suffocating his 
victim with tape, binding her feet together with electrical wire, and throwing her into the Meramec 
River. After being taken in for questioning, Simmons confessed to the murder and also performed a 
videotaped reenactment of the crime. The State sought the death penalty, and the initial court-room 
proceedings produced a jury recommendation for death penalty, which the court granted. Simmons 
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unsuccessfully filed appeals to the Missouri Supreme Court in 1997, and to the federal courts in 2001. 
In 2002, the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, which triggered Simmons to file a new petition 
for state post-conviction relief on the grounds that, like in the Atkins ruling against application of death 
penalty for mentally retarded criminals, the Court should find unconstitutional the execution of 
juveniles. 
In order to arrive at the decision in Roper, the Court relies on the same standards for “evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” previously relied upon in Atkins. 
The Court points to the number of states that ban death penalty for minors, as well as the infrequency 
of the application of underage execution in states with no such prohibition, as compared to the same 
statistics at the time of Stanford v. Kentucky. The Court points out that, at the time of the decision, 30 
states prohibited juvenile penalty (either expressly outlawing death penalty or indirectly by excluding 
juveniles from death penalty by express provision). Of the States that do permit for juvenile executions, 
only six states had executed juveniles since Stanford.  
Unlike in Atkins, the Court goes one step further in undoing the precedent case at hand in 
Roper. In Roper, the Court explicitly reneges on the promise it made in Stanford when it said it 
“‘emphatically reject[ed]’ the suggestion that the Court should bring its own judgment to bear on the 
acceptability of the juvenile death penalty” instead opining that it could use “the Court’s own 
determination … of its independent judgment” on whether “the death penalty is a disproportionate 
punishment for juveniles” 
 
Arguments in Roper Supreme Court opinions 
The main frames employed in Roper are that of retribution, international trends, and 
rehabilitation.  
Retribution. Much like in the Atkins opinion, the frame of retribution is evoked in a discussion 
on the proportionality of the punishment to the crime, particularly as it is based on the culpability of 
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the criminal. And, unsurprisingly, like all of the cases since Gregg evaluated in this research, the opinion 
in Roper cited the requirement set forth in Gregg that the two penal ends for justifying punishment were 
that of retribution and deterrence.  
To establish culpability, the majority writes about the general “vulnerability and comparative 
lack of control” of juveniles and how those qualities allow juveniles to “have a greater claim than adults 
to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment.” They find this lack 
of culpability by relying heavily on contemporary child development research, all of which indicate that 
juveniles are reckless, unduly susceptible to outside influence, and additionally most likely to change 
their errant behaviors upon rehabilitation. Citing Justice O’Connor’s concurring judgment in 
Thompson, the Court reiterates that “capital punishment must be limited to those offenders… whose 
extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution’.” The Court goes on to say that 
“retribution is not proportional if they law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability 
of blameworthiness is diminished…by reason of youth and immaturity.”  
The absolution of adolescent criminals based on a lack of culpability is hotly contested by the 
two dissenting Justices, Justice O’Connor and Justice Scalia. Both opine that, even if the Court is faced 
with a largely scientifically and historically validated fact that juveniles are “generally less mature and 
responsible than adults” (emphasis added) and therefore, generally less culpable. However, they write 
that “the Court’s proportionality argument” nonetheless “fails to support its categorical rule.” Both 
Justices tend to believe that while youth can serve as a mitigating factor, it cannot categorically remove 
youths from the death penalty. Justice O’Connor additionally distinguishes juveniles from mentally 
retarded, saying that they are “qualitatively and materially different,” since a mentally retarded person is 
“‘by definition’, one whose cognitive and behavioral capacities have been proven to fall below a certain 
minimum.’” (This differentiation is integral to her argument since she upheld the ban on executing 
mentally retarded criminals.) 
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International trends. Interestingly enough, the majority devotes a large chunk of its opinion to a 
discussion of international standards and prohibitions against juvenile capital punishment, all the while 
proclaiming that those realities “[do] not become controlling.” The opinion delves into treaties and 
foreign practices, examines the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (ratified by all 
nations except for Somalia and the United States, as the Court is quick to point out), as well as to the 
bountiful amici prepared by the European Union, Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and 
Wales, etc. Additionally, the opinion similarly singles out the United States in an even larger context: 
“Only seven countries other than the United States have executed juvenile offenders since 1990: Iran, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the DRC, and China. Since then each of these countries has 
either abolished…or made public disavowal of the practice.”   
Unsurprisingly, the two dissenting opinions took great issue with this outward-looking practice. 
Justice Scalia wrote, “‘Acknowledgement’ of foreign approval has no place in the legal opinion of this 
Court unless it is part of the basis for the Court’s judgment—which is surely what it parades as today.” Justice 
O’Connor is more mild in her disapproval: her unease with the practice mainly arose out of a fear that 
the Court was using international consensus to make up for the lack of a true domestic national 
consensus.  
Rehabilitation. The question of rehabilitation is the third strongest frame in Roper. It is particularly 
of importance to the Justices because it is precisely on the question of rehabilitation that Roper diverges 
from Atkins. Whereas rehabilitation for mentally retarded criminals seemed unlikely when compared to 
rehabilitative possibilities for normal adults, rehabilitation for juveniles seems much more likely. 
Referencing psychological studies done, the majority opinion writes that “qualities of youth are 
transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger 
years can subside.” This language clearly invokes the possibility of rehabilitating young offenders. The 
Court goes on to say more on rehabilitation: “the State cannot extinguish his life and his potential to 
attain a mature understanding of his own humanity.” 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The case study analyses of the seven death penalty cases above lead to three types of 
observations. The primary observation, and also the larger research question in this paper, concerns the 
interplay and relationship of Supreme Court arguments and corresponding newspaper coverage. The 
observations indicate that, as new issues (i.e. jury standards, juvenile execution) in death penalty 
jurisprudence arise, initial newspaper coverage of the Court’s arguments is scattered and misaligned. 
During these initial periods, the newspapers employ numerous frames to cover the Court’s arguments, 
and the relative importance that newspapers assign those disparate frames do not comport with the 
importance that the Court assigns to its different arguments. However, when the same issue is brought 
up again in later Court cases, there is a visible narrowing and closer alignment between the Court 
arguments and the newspaper frames. This primary finding holds most support for hypothesis 1.  
Additionally, two secondary observations can be made about the Court’s general death penalty 
jurisprudence as well as trends in newspaper coverage of death penalty cases. These two observations 
help contextualize the primary discussion on the interplay of the Court and the media.  
   
Interplay Between Court Arguments and Newspaper Frames 
A longitudinal overview of both the Supreme Court arguments on death penalty jurisprudence 
and the newspaper frames reveals that newspaper article frames tend to reflect a more historical 
argument from the Court. That is, in each death penalty issue area, the Supreme Court appears to set 
the boundaries of the debate, and then the news media follows those frames, if not in coverage of the 
initial case, then definitely in subsequent cases on the issue. On rare occasions, newspapers have 
defined and retrained the focus on the death penalty debate, and in doing so, seemed to guide the 
arguments in future Court discussions. This finding is largely consistent with hypothesis 1 (the Supreme 
Court initiates the frames and arguments in death penalty discourse and newspaper frames follow in 
framing, but with lag-time).  
 47 
The lag-time between Court adoption and media uptake can be explained in two main ways. 
The first is to look at the spread and variety of opinions that the newspaper articles evoke (narrowing 
frames), and the second is to look at the relative importance assigned to those arguments and frames by 
the Court and the media respectively (alignment).  
 
Narrowing Frames 
Through the first approach, one can see that for each issue area, whether that is jury standards, 
execution of minors or execution of the mentally retarded, there is initially a large number of frames 
exhibited in the newspaper coverage of the first Court case but, that the spread of the frames becomes 
narrowed in subsequent Court cases on the same issue.  
Set 1: Jury Instruction Cases (1971-1976) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Set 2: Execution of Mentally Retarded Offenders (1989-2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Set 3: Execution of Juvenile Offenders (1989-2005) 
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What these diagrams indicate is that when journalists are first exposed to a new issue in death 
penalty jurisprudence, they tend to highlight frames that are not necessarily the Court highest priority 
arguments, and cover a multitude of frames. For example, on the issue of juvenile executions, the 
media starts out with identifying five frames in Stanford, but restrict their analysis to only three frames 
by Roper. This narrowing of frames is evident in all three issue-areas examined.  
 
Gradual Alignment of Frames 
The second approach uses the alignment as a metric. Alignment refers to the alignment of 
relative importance attributed to each frame or argument by the newspapers and the Court. The graphs 
above indicate that while there is an initial period of misalignment at the introduction of an issue area, 
alignment is strengthened by later court cases in the same issue area.   
There are multiple explanations for this increase in alignment over time. One such explanation 
is that the Court reporters are able to return to past Court cases dealing in the same death penalty issue 
to examine arguments previously made by the Court to anticipate contemporary. For example, a Court 
reporter such as the Los Angeles Times’ Linda Mathews could have be reasonably taken information 
and arguments she discovered in her 1972 coverage of Furman v. Georgia and applied it to her 1976 
analysis of Gregg v. Georgia. Another closely related explanation is that journalists grapple with a learning 
curve when identifying the most relevant frames. They become better at gauging the most critical 
arguments to the Court after some time passes between the first time the issue is introduced at the 
Supreme Court level, and the next instance of reporting on a later Court case.  
It must be noted that while the theory of alignment suggests a unilateral direction of influence 
(arguments come from the Supreme Court and become adopted by pliant journalists), there are two 
arguments and frames that represent strong deviations from the trend. They are the caprice/bias 
argument identified in the set 1 cases, and the international trends argument from the set 2 and 3 cases. 
These two frames represent the only two instances in this study for which frames originating or 
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espoused by newspaper articles appear to lead the way for Court arguments of the same. Indeed, 
hypothesis 2, rather than hypothesis 1 more adequately describes the demonstrated trends: frames are 
initially introduced by newspaper articles and only later become adopted by the Court.  
The first deviant frame is that of caprice/bias, which is introduced by news coverage of 
McGautha at a time when the Court did not much heed the caprice/bias argument. Referring to the 
graph below, one can see that the Court opinion in McGautha did not deem the caprice/bias argument 
to be persuasive, since the Court does not even refer to the argument as one of its top three concerns. 
However, newspaper coverage of McGautha revealed that the caprice/bias frame was the most 
important frame of any frame covered. In later years, the Court seems to pick up on this trend in the 
subsequent Furman and Gregg cases, in which they vault the caprice/bias argument upwards as the most 
important argument in both cases. During these two cases, newspaper articles also deem the 
caprice/bias frame the most relevant. In set 2, the media indicates that the caprice/bias frame is its 
second most important consideration in Penry, and in Atkins, the 3rd most important frame, while the 
Court stays neglects to deem the caprice/bias frame compelling at all.  
  
While the caprice/bias frame is not unique in its bucking the trend predicted in hypothesis 1, it  
TABLE 8: 
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importance 
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is still highly unordinary. The exceptional nature of this frame may arise from the case facts presented 
by McGautha and the set 1 cases. In McGautha, though the Court is faced with answering whether the 
current criminal procedures were capricious in nature or fair (as represented by untrammeled jury 
discretion and flexibility between unitary and bifurcated trials), it really only discusses the history of the 
procedures themselves and explains the Court’s reticence to legislate from the bench and intrude upon 
the sovereignty of states in deciding capital punishment legislation. It is unsurprising that the 
newspapers would have picked up on this large gap between the question posed by the Court and the 
answer given. Perspicaciously, the newspaper reporters focused in on the question of caprice and bias 
in American courtrooms, despite the Court’s silence on the subject. Whether the Court’s subsequent 
adoption of the caprice/bias argument in Furman and Gregg can be contributed to its heeding news 
media interests cannot be answered by this paper; yet what is important to note is that for set 1 cases, 
there is a clear instance of the Court following behind the media.  
 The international trends frame is the other frame that does not neatly conform to hypothesis 1. 
As was the case for the caprice/bias argument, the misalignment surrounding the international trends 
argument occurs with newspaper coverage calling attention to the issue at a time with no corresponding 
Court acknowledgement. In its 1989 coverage of Stanford, newspapers demonstrated that the second 
most important frame was that of international trends: they were very interested in comparative 
analyses on how other nations considered executions of the mentally retarded “barbaric” and 
“anachronistic.” The Court on the other hand, opted not to highlight or acknowledge the international 
consensus on the issue in 1989. However, by the Atkins decision in 2002, the Court began to 
controversially include verbiage on the death penalty practices of comparable Western nations. News 
reports on Roper focused excessively on the international dimension of the debate, making the 
international trends frame the most important news frame in Atkins. Though to the Court the 
international trend argument only ranked third in importance, the fact that the frame was among the 
top three arguments is already indicative of a dramatic shift, since the Court general eschews looking 
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beyond American borders for legal guidance. Likewise, in 2005, newspaper coverage presented the 
Roper decision primarily in the light of the international trends frame, and the Court similarly also 
acknowledged their consideration of the international trends argument by again ranking the argument 
third among its top three arguments.  
 
 It is no surprise that on the issue of foreign precedent and international consensus that 
newspapers lead the way for the Court. After all, newspapers are more interested in reporting Court 
cases when they deal with issues as volatile and morally-charged as the executions of juveniles (set 3) 
and mentally retarded offenders (set 2). Unlike for the highly technical and procedural cases in set 1, the 
cases in set 2 and set 3 lend themselves to getting reported from different angles besides the sole one 
coming from the judiciary. Journalists are not confined to gleaning information from the Supreme 
Court alone on questions of morality, psychology, and progressiveness. It is no coincidence that 
newspaper reports on cases from sets 2 and 3 contain a formidable number of quotations and 
references to the opinions of interest groups ranging from the EU, presidents of nations that have 
abolished the relevant forms of executions, development psychologists, and the like. When a multitude 
of sources are available, journalists are free to seek outside expertise on the case at hand without having 
TABLE 9: International 
trends frame importance 
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to rely on the often-complex, jargon-filled ruminations on the Court. In the set 2 and set 3 cases, the 
newspapers clearly take this liberty.    
 A further exploration of the deviance from and compliance with hypothesis 1 can be found 
through a case-by-case analysis of the interplay between Court arguments and newspaper frames. The 
case-by-case analysis provides additional background and explanations of the narrowing and alignment 
trends discussed.  
  
Set 1: McGautha opinion v. media 
There was not a great alignment of frames between the Court and the newspapers. The Court 
focused on procedural aspects of the case, citing historical trends that justify its decision not to grant 
more procedural rights to defendants standing trial for capital offenses, whereas the newspaper 
coverage at the time picked up on the petitioners’ claim, which was that the sentencing procedures were 
capricious and prone to bias. The retributive frame was the second most salient frame in the newspaper 
articles, and also the third most prominent frame from the opinion, meaning it was more or less equal 
in importance to both the Court and the media. However, whereas the Court found the cost frame to 
be persuasive (it would impose too much financial burden on the states to re-design sentencing 
procedure) in turning down the petitioners’ claims, the newspaper reports seem to pay little heed to the 
possible costs of implementing a new sentencing procedure. In fact, out of the six newspaper frames 
arising from articles on McGautha, the cost frame was the least salient frame.  
 
Set 1: Furman opinion v. media 
In the case of Furman, we see a perfect alignment between the strongest frames from the Court 
itself and also what the media propagates. The frames used in the Court decision are not only all 
present in the newspaper articles, but they are represented also in the exact order of importance. The 
strongest frames in both the Court opinion and the articles are caprice/bias, deterrence, and retribution. 
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It could be possible that the saliency of arbitrariness and caprice stems from the controversial 
discussion of race and socioeconomic status implicated in the death penalty, a topic which newspaper 
audiences could easily consume, but it is just as likely that the newspapers faithfully and astutely 
conveyed the very points on capital punishment that the Court was keen to make. We see that in both 
the Court opinion and the articles that the race and arbitrariness are of high import in considering 
whether or not the death penalty should be struck down. Similarly, we observe the arguments from 
deterrence, the second strongest frame, being defended and rejected at the Court level, the articles also 
vacillate on whether deterrence is a useful (or even desirable) ends to punishment. Additionally, both 
the articles and the Court opinion address the role of retribution in punishment, with both sources 
equivocating on whether retribution is appropriate in criminal justice. Additionally, Justice Marshall’s 
concurring opinion actually outlines several frames that he believes the Court should consider in 
matters related to the death penalty; that he mentions a couple of such opinions may account for why 
such a large number of (albeit weakly propagated) frames were also evident in Furman’s corresponding 
newspaper coverage.  
 
Set 2: Gregg opinion v. media 
Much like Furman before it, the Court opinion and the newspaper articles both identified and 
bolstered the same frames with perfect alignment. The strongest frames and most salient frames 
respectively were that of caprice/bias, deterrence, and retribution, in that order. One should note that 
the sequence of strongest frames here is also an exact repetition of the strongest frames in Furman. This 
should come as little surprise, however, since the petitioners in Gregg were seeking to find loopholes in 
the Furman decision in order to reinstate the state-level death penalty statutes that Furman had struck 
down. Recall how the Court ruled in Furman that the death penalty statutes of all states were suspended 
due to the capricious and racially-linked biases inherent in the statutes. It is important to note that the 
Gregg opinion is instrumental in that its majority opinion will become frequently cited in later death 
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penalty cases. Justice Stewart’s majority opinion spells out that deterrence and retribution are the only 
two legitimate considerations in discussions on the death penalty. In fact, we see the opinions in Penry, 
Stanford, Roper, and Atkins each reference Justice Stewarts famous words as a reference point.  
 
Set 2: Penry opinion v. media 
The Penry case evokes a more mixed coverage of the Supreme Court decision; there is no 
perfect alignment, but there is also no clear divergence of the decision and the corresponding articles. 
Of the three strongest frames in the Court’s own decision, only two were salient in the articles; the 
Court’s strongest frames were retribution, historical practice, and rehabilitation. The articles 
demonstrated that the most salient issues were retribution, caprice/bias, and rehabilitation. (Historical 
practice, while covered in the articles, was not a high saliency frame.) It could be the case that the 
reporters writing the Penry opinion have become accustomed to writing with the retributive frame in 
mind, since Gregg established the high import of retribution to criminal justice. At the same time, taken 
in conjunction with the strength of the retributive frame in the Court’s own opinions, the high saliency 
of the retributive frame in the articles seems hardly like a coincidence. In fact, it seems as though there 
is a strong correlation between the opinion and the articles themselves.  
 The lack of mention of the Court’s second strongest frame, that of historical practice, could 
perhaps be explained by the technical nature of the Court’s historical practice argument, as well as by 
the sheer unpersuasiveness of the argument. Recall that the Court cited some contradictory historical 
evidence that indicated a common law prohibition against executing “idiots,” but then went on to 
distinguish “idiots” as those who were severely retarded, and not moderately or mildly retarded.  
 
Set 2: Atkins opinion v. media 
While correlation between Court frames and newspaper articles was not perfectly aligned, the 
alignment was more coherent than it had been for Penry, earlier. Of the three strongest Court frames, 
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that of retribution, deterrence, and international trends, all three appeared to gain a foothold in the 
articles reporting on the Atkins decision, though not necessarily in the same order of importance and 
saliency. While international practices on executing the mentally retarded was only the third strongest 
frame in the Court’s opinion, it was the most prevalent frame in the articles. The retributive frame 
ranked high in both sources, ranking as the strongest frame in the Court opinion and the second most 
salient frame in the articles. Deterrence was the second strongest Court frame and the fourth strongest 
article frame. Interestingly enough, the third strongest article frame, that of caprice/bias was not 
utilized by the Court. It could be the case that the newspaper articles reflected an older reasoning from 
previous Court cases on death penalty, and held on to that frame despite a lack of caprice/bias frame in 
Atkins. A holistic evaluation of the cases from set 2 would enable use to see that, in comparison to the 
correlation found in Penry, that the divergence between the Court opinion and the newspaper opinion 
narrows, that is, the papers seem to be adopting the frames the Court is espousing with some lag, but 
nonetheless propagating the frames used by the Court. We saw a similar phenomenon occurring in set 
1, when initially for McGautha, the divergence between the opinion and the articles were large, but 
eventually became fine-tuned with the introduction of Furman and Gregg.  
 
Set 3: Stanford opinion v. media 
The relationship between the Court opinion in Stanford and the articles covering the decision are 
not very strongly correlated. There is at best, a weak alignment of frames and at the worst, a distinct 
divergence in frames. We see the Court identifying historical practice, retribution, and desert as the 
most important frames in its own opinion, while the papers picked up on retribution, international 
trends, deterrence, desert, and caprice/bias, in that order. It is very significant to note that the strongest 
Court frame, that of historical practice, is not even identified in any one of the newspaper articles 
analyzed. This indicates that the journalists reporting on the decision were not interested in hearing a 
historical justification of how juvenile executions have been permitted, nor were they interested in 
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offering that to their readership. However, the journalists deemed the frame of retribution to be the 
most important frame, closely mirroring the opinion of the Court, which ranked retribution as the 
second most important frame. Retribution has been a not-unfamiliar frame, and is especially 
appropriate since the discourse in Stanford revolved around whether persons with diminished culpability 
should be given so hefty a crime. Interestingly enough, the newspapers compare the domestic ruling to 
other international trends in executing the mentally retarded defendants in an apparent effort to shed 
light on America’s backwardness in the policy area. The Court, besides in acknowledging the two amici 
briefs it received from Amnesty International and the International Human Rights Law group in a 
footnote, does not mention or compare the domestic policy to any foreign policy. Both the papers and 
the Court opinions pay homage to the desert frame, which comes in at the third strongest frame in 
both sources.  
 It is again significant to note here (as it was in the discussion on Penry) that the frame of 
caprice/bias is affirmed through newspaper reporting even though the corresponding Court decision 
makes relatively little reference to capricious or biased sentencing. This seems to indicate again that the 
newspapers are holding on to previous frames they have encountered from earlier death penalty cases 
and identifying the frames in decisions in which caprice/ bias frames are not the most important frames 
to the Court.  
 
Set 3: Roper opinion v. media 
In the Roper case, we see a more closely-aligned relationship between the Court’s opinion and 
the corresponding news articles than we saw in the earlier juvenile execution case of Stanford. Of the 
three strongest frames in the Court decisions (retribution, international trends, and rehabilitation), two 
were identified as focal and significant by the journalists, for whom the international trends, 
rehabilitation, and deterrence frames were the most important. Surprisingly, the retributive frame so 
expounded upon by the Court is nowhere to be seen in the newspaper coverage; instead, it is 
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international trends are the hottest topic in print. The latter is unsurprising, since we have seen similar 
trends in Atkins, which guides much of the juridical strategy that the petitioners in Roper rely on. 
International trends reported in the newspapers was in Roper what it was in Atkins; a space where 
journalists could leave behind the Court’s complicated jargon and instead use plentiful outside data and 
sources from media-friendly interest groups such as Amnesty International or the American 
Psychological Association. The prevalence of the international trend spotlight in the press is also more 
closely tied to the Court decision at hand however, since we did identify that Justice Scalia and Justice 
O’Connor derided the practice of looking outward to other legal regimes to inform domestic justice 
systems and that the international trends frame represented the second strongest frame in the Court 
opinion. 
 
Trends in Court Death Penalty Jurisprudence (1970s-2000s) 
 Recalling that prior to McGautha only five cases have been decided by the Supreme Court 
relating to the question of the death penalty, it must be noted that the high number of death penalty 
decisions handed out by the Court since 1971 (an additional thirty three, to compose 39) is indicative of 
a newly invigorated discussion on the role of the punishment in society. It is then, both significant and 
perhaps unsurprising that up until the 1980s, the Supreme Court treated the question of capital 
punishment no differently than it considers other modes of judicial punishments. For example, in the 
minds of the 1971 McGautha majority, the death penalty did not differ in type from pecuniary 
punishment or prison time, only in degree. The attitude towards the death penalty dramatically shifted 
by the time of Penry and Stanford (1989), where it is referred to as the ultimate penalty and differentiated 
by its extremity and its finality.  
Whereas prior to Gregg (1976) the range of justifications for the death penalty was undefined 
and remained nebulous, the majority opinion by Justice Stewart significantly narrowed and focused the 
future rhetoric of the Court: “the death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: 
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retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.” Gregg and the four synchronous 
cases associated with its decision have come to represent the beginning of the so-called “modern era of 
capital punishment,” characterized by discussions centered on retributive and deterrence-oriented ends. 
Accordingly, as is evidenced in our discussion of sets 2 and 3, the more recent cases involving 
the categorical restriction of executions on groups of persons have largely involved discussions on 
using new findings in psychology and social development in order to prove that neither retributive ends 
nor deterrence ends can be met by the imposition of the penalty on the relevant class of person. The 
Court drew heavily on sociological and scientific data provided by various interest groups and 
incorporated those findings, relating to the moral culpability of those with diminished brain capacity. 
(In a conversation I had with Lawrence Steinberg, co-author of “Not Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: 
a developmental perspective on youth and the law,” the article the Court cites extensively in its Roper 
opinion, Dr. Steinberg attributed the dramatic change of Court opinion from permitting to prohibiting 
juvenile executions to interest group efforts and the irrefutability of sociological evidence). This is a 
marked change from the Court’s unwillingness to heed sociological studies presented in the earlier cases 
from set 1, where the Court reviewed evidence suggesting that there was very little deterrence value in 
the current death penalty scheme. 
Besides these trends in Supreme Court approaches to the death penalty, one other trend must 
be noted. The opinions rendered in death penalty cases tend to be much longer than other issues before 
the Court. At the time of its rendering, Furman v. Georgia became the longest opinion ever written, 
spanning over 233 pages. Other death penalty cases have also been extremely lengthy, and by 
examining the proliferation of concurring and dissenting opinions, one can see that it is seldom the case 
that Justices are willing to join in on the opinions of other Justices in full, mostly preferring to join in 
part, or two write separate concurring opinions. For example, in Gregg, the majority was written by 
Stewart, joined by Powell and Stevens; three Justices filed concurring opinions (Rehnquist, White, and 
Blackmun), while two separate dissents were written by Brennan and Marshall. In Penry, Justice 
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O’Connor wrote the majority opinion, and her opinion was supplemented by three other opinions 
concurring and dissenting in part.  
Taken together, a more cogent picture of the Court comes into view: when it comes down to 
death penalty cases since the 1970s, the Court has not been shy in getting involved. It has been loath to 
compromise on divergent opinions and save on multiple opinions when there was opportunity to 
express and create multiple dialogues through concurring and dissenting opinions. It has changed its 
mind on the relevance and bearing of sociological and scientific data presented. It has also identified 
two strong frames that it will consider in death penalty cases, and in doing so, given the legislatures that 
must respond to the Court, some guidance for how to craft and adapt more constitutionally viable 
iterations of capital punishment. 
 
Trends in News Coverage of Death Penalty 
Beyond the comparison of frames between the Supreme Court case and its corresponding 
news-articles, the data provides an interesting look at the evolution of Supreme Court reporting over 
time. There is a significant shift in focus from the articles written in the 1970s compared to those in the 
2000s. For one, where the article focus used to be centered upon the facts of the case, and the 
arguments made by litigators, as well as the implications of the ruling on those classes of people 
affected by it, the more recent trend in reporting has centered on predicting the breakdown of the vote, 
and scrutiny around Court coalitions and voting records of individual Justices. Whereas in the earlier 
cases from set 1 tended to be more reporting done after the rendering of the verdict, there are 
comparatively more newspaper articles before the rendering of the verdict in the early days examined, 
now it appears that the proportion of articles surrounding a case are being published in light of the 
decision.  
For example, 50% of newspaper articles that covered Furman v. Georgia (1972) and Gregg v. 
Georgia (1976) were case-fact oriented in nature. I determined that an article was case-facts oriented if it 
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recounted in detail the facts of the case and provided details such as the original crime, quotes from 
litigators, and provided aggravating or mitigating evidence. This high percentage of articles focusing in 
on the case-facts declines somewhat in set 2, with 43% of the articles on Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) focusing 
on the case facts, and 50% in Stanford v. Kentucky (1989). However, by the set 3 cases, that percentage 
clearly dips, down to 37% in Roper v. Simmons (2005) and 12% in Atkins v. Virginia (2002).  
This trend may be in part due to a popularly perceived notion that the Supreme Court has 
become more and more susceptible to ideological leanings in recent years. Regardless of the veracity of 
that belief, it has encouraged a focus on individual votes from members of the Court, and discussions 
of the political motivations behind Court coalitions.  
 
Limitations, Implications, Further Research 
With the significant advantages of using a case-study approach come certain limitations. Some 
drawbacks of the case-study approach employed include the limited nature of the study’s 
generalizability outside of Supreme Court cases and outside of death penalty contexts. Death penalty 
issues made for interesting study in part due to their high saliency, but that very same high saliency 
characteristic may also contribute to the potentially unrepresentative nature of the conclusions drawn 
here. Additionally, the limited nature of the articles available from ProQuest may have diminished both 
the number of relevant articles examined, as well as contributed bias in the kinds of newspapers that 
were represented. ProQuest’s databases largely provided archives from more metropolitan and more 
widely-read papers.  
In order to further bolster the conclusions found here, three kinds of further research can be 
pursued. One such approach would be to apply the methodology outlined in this paper to the rest of 
the 32 Supreme Court death penalty cases (there will soon be 40 death penalty cases after Hall v. 
Florida is decided in 2014 to clarify challenges to the Atkins decision). Another would be to extend the 
same methodology to other Supreme Court cases involving the Eighth Amendment and debates 
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surrounding all kinds of punishment. The final recommendation would be to pursue research that 
compares the public and newspaper attitudes towards death penalty over the time period studied in 
order to provide more context to possible motivations of the press in selecting the frames exhibited.  
 This study holds important implications for the Supreme Court, and also the reporters on the 
Supreme Court beat. The Court, armed with the expectation that the press may not immediately hone 
in on arguments most important to the Court, can endeavor to clarify and prioritize its points for better 
press interpretation. This implication applies especially to the inaugural decision on the introduction 
issue areas. The Court may be additionally incentivized to clarify its inaugural decisions since surveys of 
appellate and district court judges reveal that practitioners of law depend heavily on newspaper 
accounts of Supreme Court decisions, and not on law review articles or Supreme Court decisions 
themselves.  
 For the Court reporters, the exceptions found in their persistent coverage of the caprice/bias 
frame in the 1970s and their use of international trends in death penalty have proven that the directed 
efforts of their coverage may indeed influence and help define the parameters of future Supreme Court 
debates. This should encourage Court reporters not only to report the facts of the decision, but also to 
contemplate the possible repercussions of their espousing particular frames of analysis.  
 
  
 62 
REFERENCES 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
Chomsky, Noam S., and Herman, Edward S. 1988 Manufacturing Consent: the Political Economy of the Mass 
Media. Ed. Noam S. Chomsky. 2nd ed. New York: Pantheon Prints.  
Feinberg, Joel. 1980. "The Expressive Function of Punishment." Sentencing. Eds. Hyman Gross and 
Andrew von Hirsch. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 23.  
Finckenauer, J. O. 1998. "Public Support for the Death Penalty: Retribution as just Deserts Or 
Retribution as Revenge?" Justice Quarterly 5.1: 81-100.  
Friedman, Barry. 2009.  "Invalidating the Death Penalty, then Backtracking." The Will of the People: How 
Public Opinion has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution. New York; 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 281.  
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1971) 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) 
Hart, H. L. A.. " I PROLEGOMENON TO THE PRINCIPLES OF PUNISHMENT." . . . n.d.  
Hoekstra, Valerie J. 2000. "The Supreme Court and Local Public Opinion." The American Political Science 
Review 94.1: 89-100.  
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) 
Mondak, Jeffery J. 1994. “Policy Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: The Sources and Contexts of 
Legitimation.” Political Research Quarterly. Vol 47.  
Moran, Gary, and Brian L. Cutler. 1991. "The Prejudicial Impact of Pretrial Publicity." Journal of Applied 
Social Psychology 21.5: 345-67.  
Niven, David. 2002. "Bolstering an Illusory Majority: The Effects of the Media's Portrayal of Death 
Penalty Support." Social Science Quarterly 83.3 671-89.  
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) 
Radelet, Michael L., and Borg, Marian J. 2000. "The Changing Nature of Death Penalty Debates." 
Annual Review of Sociology 26: 43-61.   
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 511 (2005) 
Slotnik, Michael E. 1991. "Media Coverage of Supreme Court Decision Making: Problems and 
Prospects." Judicature 75.3: 128-142.  
 63 
Smith, S. F. 2007. "The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death." University of Virginia Legal Working 
Paper Series :79.  
Spill, R. L., and Z. M. Oxley. 2003. "Philosopher Kings Or Political Actors-how the Media Portray the 
Supreme Court." Judicature 87: 23 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) 
Yanus, Alixandra B. 2009. "Full-Court Press: An Examination of Media Coverage of State Supreme 
Courts." The Justice System Journal 30.2: 180-95.  
 
  
 64 
APPENDIX A 
 
For example of how an article is assigned its three frames, and its additional factors, look to the below 
article on Gregg v. Georgia, and its annotations. The additional factors present have been denoted in red 
bubbles and red text, while discussions of the relevant frames are in blue.  
 
• Publication Date: July 3, 1976 
• Headline: Decision is 7 to 2: Punishment is Ruled Acceptable at Least in Murder Cases 
• Publication organization: New York Times 
• Breakdown of decision?  Yes 
• Direct quote from majority Justices? Yes 
• Direct quote from dissenting Justices? Yes 
• Court-focused? Yes 
• Case-fact focused? No 
• Editorializing? No 
• Mitigating background story of defendants? No 
• Description of crime committed? Yes 
• Mention of amicus curiae? No 
• Invokes phrase “cruel and unusual”? Yes 
• Invokes phrase “evolving standards”? No 
• Discusses implications of decision on current death row population or statutes? Yes 
• Citation of previously-decided cases? Yes, refers back to Furman v. Georgia 
o Frame 1: Retribution 
o Frame 2: Deterrence 
o Frame 3: Arbitrariness 
 
  For the below article, one can see that three frames (caprice/bias, retribution, deterrence) are 
all mentioned: how, then, are their relative rankings determined? For one, the caprice/bias frame is not 
mentioned explicitly: it is only referenced through the idea of “arbitrariness” or a lack of “consistency,” 
and only discussed in as far as the impact of arbitrariness on the earlier Furman decision. That is easily 
the weakest of the three frames. The frames of deterrence and retribution are both mentioned explicitly 
and discussed in detail, but the discussion on the deterrence frame is shorter in length. Additionally, we 
see elements of the retributive frame interspersed in the article – near the end of the article, there is talk 
on the permissibility of mitigating factors, which entails the retributive frame’s concerns with evaluating 
blameworthiness. Because the retributive frame is discussed in more detail, and in more sections than 
the desert frame, the strongest frame in this article is retribution, followed by desert, and trailed by 
caprice/bias.  
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
DECISION IS 7 TO 2: Punishment Is Ruled Acceptable, at Least in ...
New York Times (1923-Current file); Jul 3, 1976; 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009)
pg. 1
Gives ruling 
break-down
Evokes the term 
"Cruel and Unusual"
Direct reference to arbitrariness, 
which signals the Caprice/bias 
frame. Even though this refers 
back to Furman, it is still evocation 
of the Caprice/bias frame.
Finding Frames: 
Deciphered
Text in blue 
denote 
frames of 
punishment
Text in red 
discusses 
other 
factors
(not frames)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Also, this is a direct 
quote from the 
majority, which is a 
factor we consider.
Dissenting quote
mitigation is a 
concept linked 
to retribution
Describes 
crime
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APPENDIX B 
 
The tables at the end of each Supreme Court case analysis represent the interplay of the Court 
arguments found in that case, and also the frames ascribed by the Court reporters.  
 
For example, taking Table 1, on the discussion of Gregg v. Georgia:  
 
TABLE 3 
Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 
Vote: 7 - 2  
Decision: The new Death Penalty 
statutes in question are 
constitutional. (Ends moratorium 
on executions imposed by 
Furman) 
Frames from Court Opinion:  
1. Caprice/bias 
2. Deterrence/Retribution 
3. Desert 
 
 
 
The left hand side of the table summarizes the Supreme Court history of the case, as well as the three 
strongest arguments presented in the Court.  
 
The right hand side is a cumulative bar graph of the strongest frames identified by the press in its 
coverage of the relevant case. The graph is titled with the case name and then succeeded by the number 
of newspaper articles analyzed. The X-axis is populated by the frames identified by the newspaper 
articles. The Y-axis features the relative strength and expression of the frames identified.  
 
The darker colors within each graph represents a frame/argument that is both affirmed by the Court 
opinion and newspaper articles. Lighter colors represent a frame that is only affirmed by newspaper 
articles. The numerical labels on the top of each darker bar indicate the relative importance of the 
argument to the Court.  
 
The calculations for the relative strength is described below. 
 
The strongest frame apparent in each article is weighed at three points; the second strongest at 
two, and the third strongest frame at one. For each case’s articles, I tally up the weighed totals of the 
frames after having compiled and analyzed all relevant articles. For example, if the “caprice/bias” frame 
was found in four articles about Gregg to be the strongest frame, in no articles as the second strongest, 
and in two articles as the third strongest, then the weighed total of the caprice/bias frame in Gregg 
would be (4(3) + 0(2) + 2(1)) = 14. Compared to the totals of the other frames detected, the 
caprice/bias frame is the strongest frame in the newspaper coverage of Gregg.  
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Frame 1 
(x3) 
Frame 2 
(x2) 
Frame 3 
(x1) Total 
Caprice/bias 4                  0 2 14 
Deterrence 3 1 1 12 
Retribution 2 2                  0 10 
Innocence                  0 1                  0 2 
 
 
 
 
